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Abstract
In Australia, biodiversity loss is a national concern, especially in agricultural landscapes such as
the West Australian wheatbelt. Landscape restructuring offers a means of ameliorating such
losses. If restructuring is to occur, the associated actions must match the ‘triple bottom line’, they
must be economically gainful, socially adoptable and ecologically possible. This paper addresses
one component of this bottom line, social influences. To further focus this discussion, remnant
vegetation conservation, one important element of managing for biodiversity, is explored on
private lands in the WA wheatbelt.
The social influences on the landscapes of the WA wheatbelt are cultural, political and
economic. History and attitudes can be considered key elements of culture. Historically, the WA
wheatbelt has experienced a number of ‘waves’ of clearing of remnant vegetation, generally
directed toward improving the nation’s agricultural production as well as populating rural
areas. In terms of attitudes, the majority of landholders in the wheatbelt talk positively about
nature conservation. Unfortunately, however, results from research in Australia and elsewhere
indicates that the links between attitudes and behaviour are tenuous. In Australian agricultural
areas behaviour is better predicted and influenced by landholders’ perceptions of environmental
problems, the financial constraints they face, and the farming subculture to which they belong.
Politically in Australia, the character of rural landscapes is predominantly influenced by state
governments. In terms of economic influences, if a change is not economically viable, rural
landholders will not make it.
In Australia as elsewhere, governments seek to restructure rural landscapes through applying
policy instruments. These are tools, generally used by government, to change how people
behave. Instruments available to conserve remnant vegetation on private lands include
motivational ones (eg, education, partnerships), financial (eg, subsidies), market-based (eg,
tradeable rights), self-regulatory (eg, codes of practice) and regulatory (eg, regulations). Most
are voluntary with current trends favouring such approaches. In particular, policy makers are
interested in market-based and self-regulatory instruments, as both are perceived as righting
current market failures.
A question vexing policy makers and others is selecting the ‘best’ policy instrument(s) to achieve
biodiversity conservation. Principles can be derived to help answer this question. Of central
importance is selecting more than one instrument and making sure the instrument mix is
complementary. Clearly identifying the property rights associated with remnant vegetation on
private lands, and therefore who pays for and receives the associated costs and benefits, is also
important. Crucial too is matching the policy instrument with the appropriate institution,
whether it is Commonwealth, state or local government, industry, a community group or
individual. And last, because regions and their landscapes have different legal, social and
environmental features, different landscapes will require different policy mixes.2
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Introduction
Rural landscapes are being restructured for a range of reasons. In Australia, landholders
are being encouraged to retain native vegetation or replant it to improve water and soil
quality and biodiversity. In the European Union, field afforestation is being used to
control agricultural over-production (Selby and Petajisto 1995). Broader cultural and
economic reasons also influence landscape restructuring. Changes in land tenure
through shifts from communist to capitalise regimes have dramatically changed
landscapes in the eastern bloc. For example, the Czech Republic has recently
experienced, through the ‘velvet revolution’, increased concentration and intensification
of land use resulting in a decline in landscape heterogeneity and biodiversity loss
(Cudlinova et al. 1999).
Restructuring is obviously an immense topic. To make the subject manageable, I have
assumed a focus on restructuring rural landscapes to achieve sustainability. Sustainable
land management can only be achieved if activities are economically gainful, culturally
(socially) adoptable and ecologically possible (Fig. 1, Firey 1960). If restructuring is to
succeed it must meet these three criteria, also referred to as the “triple bottom line”
(Elkington 1997). Recent policy initiatives in sustainable regional development (Dore et
al. 2000) similarly base such development on integrating environmental, economic and
community concerns. A great deal is now known about what is required to change the
ecological structure and function of rural landscapes, and although much remains
unknown a wealth of research continues. Less well understood are the economic factors
influencing landscape change, although again research continues to focus on this area.
Least well understood are the social factors and as such these are the predominant focus
of this paper.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
To help further narrow the focus of this paper, I have assumed a central goal of
landscape restructuring as improving biodiversity. Such a focus fits with the Australia
State of the Environment Report (State of the Environment Advisory Council 1996)
reporting biodiversity loss as a key area where the natural environment is under
pressure. One of the landscapes where biodiversity loss has been greatest in Australia is
in dryland agricultural areas. Broadscale clearing has resulted in less than 20% native
vegetation remaining. An estimated 80% of the remaining vegetated area in Western
Australia is susceptible to salinity and likely to be lost without remedial action
(Government of Western Australia 1998). One obvious way of improving biodiversity in
these landscapes is through protecting remaining native vegetation and planting native
species on private lands. As such, the following discussion centres on social influences
on remnant vegetation protection on privately owned lands in the dryland agricultural
areas of Australia and specifically, the WA wheatbelt.
Cultural Influences
Landscapes and their elements, such as remnant vegetation, are culturally as well as
biologically and physically determined. Culture can be defined as the web of history,
attitudes and values within which a society rests (Hall 1990).
Australia has been subject to human settlement for at least 40,000  -60,000 years (Dingle
1988, in Thackway and Brunkhorst 1998). Europeans have occupied the country for the3
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last 200 years. As such, the Australian landscape has been subject to extended periods of
major, human-induced change (Flannery 1994). First, Aboriginal people strategically
used fire to create browse and flush game. Then, successive waves of European settlers
cleared land for agriculture, used rangelands for grazing domestic stock and removed
timber for construction and more recently paper production purposes. Mining and
urban development have also resulted in modification of smaller areas of the natural
landscape. The middle part of the 20
th century was characterised by government
encouragement to clear native vegetation from large tracts of agricultural land, while
the latter part of this century has seen increasing advocacy of native vegetation retention
by some but not all sectors of Australian society. Thus, Australia has a history of
successive waves of change to rural landscapes, the most recent being moves towards
protecting remnant vegetation.
Attitudes, a ‘learned disposition to respond in a consistent…manner with respect to a
given object’ (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, 6), are often considered as a key component of
culture. Ideally described, environmental stimuli are mediated by attitudes and
behaviours result. According to this ideal, farmers with the right attitude (ie,
conservation oriented) will act to address land degradation, while those with the
‘wrong’ attitudes (ie, non-conservation oriented) will not act to ameliorate land
degradation (Vanclay and Lawrence 1995). Unfortunately in environmental matters at
least, attitudes generally do not predict behaviour. A study of Darling Downs farmers
by Vanclay (1992) showed that although farmers had positive attitudes to the
environment and soil conservation, these attitudes did not translate into soil
conservation actions or the amelioration of land degradation.
Of more importance and influence than attitudes, is how landholders perceive the
problems they potentially face in managing their lands. In a study of Darling Downs
farmers, their actions (or inaction) were more influenced by their perceptions of land
degradation, and their personal and financial situation, than their attitudes (Fig. 2).
Landholders consistently understate and misperceive the extent to which their lands are
affected by land degradation. Often they recognise land degradation as a community
problem but not as one affecting them personally (Vanclay and Lawrence 1995). In
relation to salinity, Pannell (2001) offers an alternative perspective, noting that lack of
awareness of salinity is probably not a factor in explaining the slow adoption of
recommended practices.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Interviews with farmers in southern Western Australia in 1986 and then 10 years later in
1996 about native vegetation on farms provide some interesting insights into attitudes,
behaviour and perceptions of environmental degradation. Jenkins (1998) found no
change, between the two surveys, in the high levels of awareness of the ecological and
land conservation values of bush on farms. So, there was no change in attitudes.
However, there was a change in on-farm actions. In 1986, 64% of farmers had planted
trees and shrubs and by 1996, 84% of farmers had done so. Many fewer (41% in 1996
compared to 71%in 1986) used their bushland for grazing stock. Farmers attributed this
change in behaviour to their greater knowledge of the problems of land degradation.
Other cultural elements likely to affect the actions of landholders in relation to
landscape restructuring are financial considerations, the behaviours of other
landholders, an individual’s sense of identity, and their perceptions of risk, uncertainty4
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and complexity. Farming is a business as well as a life style. Landholders are most likely
to change their land management practices if there are clear economic benefits,
preferably in the short rather than longer term. The more expensive changes are in terms
of capital outlay and labour, the less likely they are to occur (Vanclay and Lawrence
1995).
Landholders are likely to be more influenced by the behaviour of others, either their
neighbours or others in the groups with which they are associated, than by their own
attitudes (Vanclay and Lawrence 1995). Farming subcultures depend on the region,
climate, product type and history. Each subculture defines ‘acceptable’ agricultural
practices. Those with views and behaviours different to the mainstream tend to be
ostracised. Farming subcultures in Australia are characterised by individualism –
individual farmers have the right to do what they like with their farms.
As well, landholders are also influenced by their personal sense of identity, who and
what they are (Moore 1997). A key element of this identity for many is having
productive farmlands contributing to the economic wellbeing of their family and their
community. Such an identity may be expressed as pride in stock or grain produced or in
the neatness of a farm. More recently, part of this identity has been linked to
successfully planting and growing trees and shrubs to arrest land degradation.
Restructuring rural landscapes requires change. As such, it is crucial to understand the
risks for landholders associated with change and the intellectual energy required to
master them. There will be financial risks if major capital outlays are required.
Environmental risks will exist where there is uncertainty regarding the benefits of an
action, such as digging deep drains to prevent waterlogging. For some, the intellectual
task of mastering new technology and information may not be regarded as worth the
effort and may not be possible. Many farmers do not have a formal education and being
in their 50s and 60s, may not be motivated or have the money to undertake the further
studies needed to deal with new approaches (Vanclay and Lawrence 1995).
The nature of proposed changes is the final important cultural consideration. If the
likely changes are complex, indivisible and inflexible, then implementation is unlikely.
Complexity makes the required changes hard to understand and to implement. The
responses required today to land degradation concerns such as salinity are complex. The
explanation behind problems may also be complex, as is the case with salinity and as
such farmers may not believe or understand there is a problem. Greater management
skills are also needed to deal with these complex problems. Salinity management, for
example, may require whole-farm planning, strategic planting of perennials and
drainage works, and major changes in cropping regimes and practices. Landscape
restructuring is a problem requiring a holistic, ‘indivisible’ approach. As such, partial
change may be insufficient. Adoption of changes is regarded as more likely if partial
uptake, regarded as a trial, occurs and can then be followed by complete adoption
(Vanclay and Lawrence 1995).
Political Influences
The Australian political landscape greatly influences land management practices and
possibilities. This federalist landscape is comprised of six states and two territories, each
with their own government, drawn together by a single Commonwealth government. A
number of powers are specified in the Australian Constitution as resting with the5
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Commonwealth, however, land management, agriculture, mining and regional
development appear to be state responsibilities (Saunders, 1996). Thus, environmental
policy making and implementation is generally a state responsibility. The
Commonwealth seeks to influence the states through financial incentives such as tax
concessions and grants. The most recent example is the Commonwealth’s $1.5 billion
Natural Heritage Trust to develop sustainable agriculture and natural resource
management, as well as protect biodiversity (Commonwealth of Australia 1997).
Because of the ability of the Commonwealth to guide the states through financial
control, Australia’s system of governance has often been described as coercive rather
than cooperative federalism (Rydon 1989).
One other feature of Australia’s system of governance warranting mention is the
existence of a third tier of government - local government (about 780 across Australia in
1996). Their core functions in relation to the natural environment are fourfold:
responsibility for developing and implementing detailed land use plans and associated
zones; approving developments; managing significant areas of Crown land; and
managing environmental risks such as fires and floods (Binning et al. 1999). Thus, there
are three tiers of government providing potential sources of public policy for landscape
restructuring.
Although the state government has primary responsibility for the environment in the
WA wheatbelt they are dependent on the actions of numerous private landholders. This
is because most of these lands are privately owned. As mentioned earlier, Australian
landholders are characterised by strong beliefs in their right to decide how their lands
are managed. Thus broadscale restructuring will require support and actions by large
numbers of these private landholders.
Economic Influences
Unless a change is economically viable it is unlikely to occur (Pannell 2001). The need
for economic viability underpins the concept of the triple bottom line (Fig. 1), along with
changes being socially acceptable and biologically possible. For private landholders, this
means that changes to how their lands are managed need to make them no worse off
financially. Therefore, protecting existing or planting more remnant vegetation will only
be undertaken if it makes the landholder no worse off.
A limited amount of work has been done on the economic value of remnant vegetation.
The Native Vegetation Working Group (2000) briefly reported on three broad options
for using bush for financial benefit: using it for seed collecting, wildflowers or
ecotourism; selling it and using the money to invest elsewhere; and clearing and
developing the land for agriculture or other income-earning activities. The profitability
of using bush is highly variable, with values varying widely from a minimal figure to
over $1,500 per hectare (ACIL Economics 1993 in Native Vegetation Working Group
2000). The benefit of selling the land and investing elsewhere depends on the market for
bush blocks and the rates of return from alternative forms of investment. The
profitability of clearing is similarly unclear, depending on clearing and production costs,
the profitability of the new land use and the level of debt incurred to make clearing
possible. Not included in any of these evaluations are the longer-term benefits of
remnant vegetation such as the provision of ecosystem services such as soil protection
and water quality contributions, aesthetic values and contributions to the general6
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wellbeing of the landholder and their community (Native Vegetation Working Group
2000).
Globalisation is an indirect but nevertheless important economic consideration in
landscape restructuring. Transnational firms, a dominant feature of globalisation, are
now in a position to stipulate where and how the raw materials they require will be
produced. Contract farming, a related change, is also transferring responsibility for a
number of production and environmental management decisions from farmers to
corporations. Farmers are increasingly having to conform to using the required inputs,
such as specified pesticides/herbicides applied at specified times, to produce the
desired outputs. Corporations can maintain control over farmers by threatening not to
accept their crops, leaving them with no market. And, corporate concerns about profits
may result in less investment in conservation activities than farmers on their own might
have done. As such, there may be little flexibility to change forms of production
(Vanclay and Lawrence 1995).
Policy Instruments for Remnant Vegetation Conservation
The above social influences – culture, politics and economics – generally influence
landscapes and hence their restructuring. How such restructuring is initiated and
achieved is the through policy instruments. These are tools, such as regulations and
financial incentives, generally used by governments, to change how people behave.
They often appear in policy documents, such as Australia’s National Biodiversity
Strategy (Griffin nrm P/L 1993) and Western Australia’s Salinity Strategy (State Salinity
Council 2000). Generally, a policy document is specific to a single tier of government.
Policy instruments may also appear as amendments to or new pieces of legislation, as
part of a political party’s policy statements, or as part of governmental administrative
procedures. Policy instruments are not the sole domain of governments. Industry codes
of conduct and product accreditation, initiated by producer and industry groups,
provide a means for private individuals and groups to guide their own change. Other
non-government organisations such as the Australian Conservation Foundation rely on
policy instruments such as education and partnerships in their efforts to facilitate
change.
Categories of Policy Instruments
Policy instruments that could be evoked to conserve remnant vegetation in the WA
wheatbelt can be categorised in many different ways (Bridgman and Davis 1998). Here
they are grouped according to where activity is focused. For example, market-based
mechanisms where implementation relies on the market place are separated from
financially based instruments relying on government payments or financial
adjustments. They are also separated depending on whether they rely on voluntary
adoption by the landholder or if coercion is intended. In Table 1, the first four of the five
categories rely on voluntary adoption by the landholder, while only regulatory
instruments have elements of coercion. Current political and social preferences are for
voluntary instruments.7
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Table 1. Policy instruments available to manage remnant vegetation as part of landscape
restructuring
1. Motivational Instruments
- information and education
- management agreements (also linked to Financial Instruments)
- partnerships
- awards and prizes
- farm planning
2. Financial Instruments
- grants and payments
- subsidies
- taxes and rates
- environmental levies
- charges and fees
3. Market-Based Instruments
- land purchases, revolving funds and land trading
- tradeable permits and rights
4. Self-Regulatory Instruments
- codes of practice/best management practice
- accreditation and environmental management systems (EMS)
5. Regulatory Instruments
- legislation and regulation
- land use planning
- direct provision
1. Motivational Instruments
Motivational instruments rely on individuals or companies being motivated to change
their behaviour in desired ways. The most common motivational instruments are
education and information, partnerships, awards and prizes, and management
agreements. Young and Gunningham (1997) argued that motivational instruments are
central to biodiversity management. They suggested that if people are positively
motivated they are more likely to respond constructively to a range of instruments,
including regulation.
Education and Information
Landholders in the WA wheatbelt seeking information on remnant vegetation
management rely on a diversity of information sources, with the most popular being
state government departments, community landcare coordinators and field days. Also8
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important are newspapers, community organisations such as Greening Australia,
newsletters and television (Moore and Renton, in prep.). These authors noted that less
than 10% of those surveyed relied on local government, the internet and radio. On the
other hand, information provided by other farmers was important to over half of those
surveyed.
Australiawide, landholders continue to identify the lack of information in accessible,
practical and implementable forms, as one of the stumbling blocks to remnant
vegetation management (Williams 2000, Moore and Renton, in prep.). There are several
reasons why the huge amount of information currently available is not necessarily
useful (Morton 1999, Moore and Renton, in prep.). Much of the advice is very general
while landholders want advice specific to their landscape and farm-level issues. Another
concern is the lack of financial details accompanying the numerous technical options.
And, the human, personal support, that is extension services, is often not available to
interpret, modify and support the available technical information.
Williams (2000) in reviewing recent LWRRDC projects addressing information
provision noted that the most effective form of communication is getting out and talking
to people. Landholders also prefer to gain information this way (Moore and Renton, in
prep.). Interestingly, Williams (2000) noted that while printed/electronic information is
an essential component of any extension program, it must be promoted and interpreted
for landholders and made relevant to their situation.
How effective is providing information and education in the absence of regulation?
Williams (2000) drawing on the work of Kirkpatrick in Tasmania, noted that in 80% of
cases, incentives, education and extension in the absence of regulation were ineffective
in conserving native vegetation. Long-term conservation of vegetation remnants seems
to require legal measures to prevent clearing or degradation.
Management Agreements
Management agreements are a contract between a landholder and a third party
regarding the use and management of their land. They are usually voluntary and
provide a flexible policy instrument that can tailored to meet the need of individuals
and the values being managed. A range of levels of commitment from landholders is
possible, from non-binding through to binding. They are often used in combination with
other instruments, for example, financial incentives may be added to encourage
landholders to enter agreements. Management agreements continue to be a favoured
policy instrument by government and conservation groups.
Binning and Young (1997) identified three types of agreement involving varying
commitments from landholders: non-binding, fixed-term and in-perpetuity. Non-
binding agreements depend on the voluntary participation of landholders. The
objectives are to establish networks of like-minded landholders and provide
management advice. Such agreements formally recognise landholder’s conservation
efforts without binding them or precluding future land uses. Land for Wildlife in
Victoria and Western Australia are examples of this approach.
Fixed-term agreements do not bind the landholder in perpetuity so a small incentive
may secure their participation. The best example from Australia is the WA Remnant
Vegetation Protection Scheme, providing assistance to landholders to fence remnant9
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vegetation. Funding is tied to a 30-year contract deed for the protection and
management of the vegetation. Binning and Young (1997) reported that as of 1997 over
1,094 projects had been funded with more than 38,000 hectares fenced at a cost of $2.25
million. Assistance has ranged from 50-100% of material costs with the labour provided
by the landholder.
Binning and Young (1997) regarded agreements such as those reached under the WA
RVPS as ‘transition agreements’. They see these agreements as securing a permanent
change in property rights through a one-off incentive payment. They are also suggesting
that managing the fenced area for nature conservation then becomes part of the
landholder’s duty of care and hence further costs become the landholder’s
responsibility.
In-perpetuity agreements involve placing a covenant on the title of the land, with the
entitlements and obligations contained in the management agreement binding on the
current and future landholders. Such agreements help re-define the duty of care and
secure future conservation outcomes, however, their binding nature can discourage
landholders from signing up. Programs actively encouraging perpetual covenants are in
place in NSW, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. Such arrangements may
be negotiated with an independent body such as the Trust for Nature in Victoria or with
a government department such as the Parks Service in NSW.
In North America, ‘easements’ on private lands are acquired either by public agencies
such as the US Fish and Wildlife Service or private conservation organisations, to
protect fish and wildlife habitats. Such easements are generally perpetual and payment
levels depend on the extent of rights acquired from the landholder (Johnson et al. 1994).
Efforts are then made to restore many of these areas to more ‘natural’ states.
These different types of agreement can be seen as complementary. Non-binding
agreements can function as a starting point for landholders. Over time they may become
more comfortable with the concept of a binding agreement. For example, of the 3,500
registered properties in Land for Wildlife in Victoria (based on non-binding
agreements), a significant number of landholders have gone onto perpetuity agreements
with the Victorian Trust for Nature with its 230 covenants in place (Platt and Ahern
1996, in Binning and Young 1997). Binding agreements are usually tied to some form of
financial assistance for the landholder.
There is a suite of possible payment mechanisms (Binning and Young 1997).
Compensation may be paid for the loss of rights to alternative land uses, such as
clearing for cropping. This is payment for the acquisition of property rights. Upfront
payments for management can be made as an inducement to sign up. The payment can
be based on an assessment of management required or a payment for the area of land
covered by the agreement. Competitive bidding is a novel potential approach with
landholders bidding for the price and accompanying management actions at which they
would be willing to enter an agreement. Another alternative is paying the costs of
management incrementally as they occur. This could have high administrative costs.
Payment could also be based on performance, measured against clear management
objectives. Trusts and discretionary funds could possibly provide recurrent payments.
Non-financial payments could also be helpful. An example is extension services
provided free-of-charge by the contracting organisation.10
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Bowers (1999) writing about management agreements for nature conservation in the
United Kingdom, identified payments as based on the management objectives of the
agreement. He classified agreements as critical site (objective: maintenance of scientific
interest), standard payment (maintenance of landscape), enhancement (enhancement of
environment) or rehabilitation (re-creation of habitat) agreements. All are voluntary and
fixed term. For critical site and rehabilitation agreements, the payments are specific to
the particular site. For the other two, standard payments are based on certain
restrictions to landholder operations while a standard set of management practices and
payments exists for enhancement agreements.
Crabtree and Chalmers (1994) noted that standard payments are an efficient
management agreement because, with their fixed rates, they do not need to be
negotiated with individual landholders. They are most effective when used for habitat
and landscape enhancement rather than restricting landholder’s activities. Most apply to
grassland and restricting fertiliser application, stocking rates and grazing periods
(Bowers 1999). If landholders can be placed into broad categories, such as those with
similar quality lands or vegetation types or management requirements then an equitable
level of payment can be determined for members of homogeneous groups. Such
grouping of landholders should reduce administrative costs and improve equity
between participants. They are being increasingly used in the UK and EU (Crabtree and
Chalmers 1994). These authors suggested that effectiveness could be enhanced by
complementary use of other instruments such as regulation.
The strength of management agreements, over other instruments, lies in their focus on
management arrangements for an individual site (Binning and Young 1997). They
establish new entitlements and responsibilities for an area of land, individually tailored
for a site and its owner. However, because they are site-specific they are more expensive
to set up and administer and thus are best targeted to areas of high priority.
Partnerships
Partnerships seem to have been the catchword of the last half of the 1990s. There is no
doubt that the ownership and commitment engendered by partnerships between
landholders, government and in some instances industry can lead to significant
improvements in remnant vegetation management on the ground. An example of a
successful partnership of this nature is the Gabby Quoi Quoi catchment in Western
Australia, a partnership between the local catchment group and its landholders, the WA
government and Alcoa Australia. The on-ground outcomes of this collaboration include
managing 839 ha of land with 312,600 trees planted, 25 km of surface drainage,
protecting 133 ha of remnant vegetation and treating 490 ha of saltland (Landcare Vision
1996). More recently Greening Australia WA, a non-government conservation
organisation, has joined this partnership through the Living Landscapes project.
Awards and Prizes
Competitions, awards and prizes are another way of motivating and rewarding changes




Managing remnant vegetation on private lands requires its consideration and inclusion
in whole farm planning and management (Williams 2000). Instruments already exist at
both Commonwealth and state levels to help farmers manage their farms as viable
businesses. For example, the Better Business Program in Western Australia (this state’s
version of the Commonwealth’s Property Management Planning Program) aims to help
landholders and their families set goals for their farming enterprise and future. Rather
than focusing on traditional farm business approaches, the Native Vegetation Working
Group (2000) suggested re-focusing this program on sustainability planning, including
providing advice on bushland protection and management.
2. Financial Instruments
Binning and Young (1997) commented that financial incentives are the most powerful
and direct means of encouraging more people to participate in nature conservation
programs. Australia has only modest funds available for incentive payments. However,
this is not necessarily an impediment, given that payments have a strong symbolic as
well as practical element. Even offering a small incentive may be highly regarded by a
landholder who sees it as due recognition for the conservation service they are
providing the public. Such incentive instruments fall into one of three categories: (1)
those that give money to landholders (ie, through grants and subsidies); (2) those that
enable landholders to keep money that otherwise would have been taken away (ie,
changes to rates and taxes); (3) and those that take money away either from landholders
who are doing the wrong thing (ie, through fees and charges) or from everyone to
support remnant vegetation management (ie, through an environmental levy).
Grants and Subsidies
Both terms refer to financial assistance provided to groups or individuals, usually by
governments. Both are very flexible instruments and can either be tied to an outcome
such as x kilometres of fencing or be untied. The source of grants can be equally as
varied, from Commonwealth, through State to local government (Cripps et al. 1999).
Recent UK and EU environmental policy has tended to rely on voluntary incentive
schemes rather than regulation. The two instruments regarded as most important in
these regions are standard payments and capital grants (Crabtree and Chalmers 1994).
The first is a voluntary arrangement where payments are used to induce constraints on
farm activities to achieve nature conservation objectives. It has been the main method
used to support forest planting. Fixed rates of payment are offered for prescribed
activities. Capital grants are subsidies on environmentally beneficial capital investment
with the grant given as a proportion of cost. They are input subsidies restricted to
capital works and based on notions of cost-sharing.
Another incentive payment falling under the umbrella of grants and subsidies is
stewardship payments. The National Natural Resource Management Task Force (1999)
suggested such payments (which are essentially the same as the standard payments
discussed above) could facilitate fundamental land use change by providing an income
for conservation activities. Payments could be a lump sum or an annuity. Payment
could be for retaining and managing an area of remnant vegetation, for example to abate
dryland salinity. The payments would be linked to managing for ecosystem values12
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benefiting the public interest. Payments would not be for works perceived to be part of a
landholder’s duty of care for sustainable land management.
Where regional action is required but it is not critical where it occurs, auctions or a
tendering process could be used to determine which landholder(s) get to do the work.
For example, landholders could bid for rehabilitation grants. Such an approach aims to
achieve least-cost delivery (National Natural Resource Management Task Force, 1999).
Many of the possible ways of subsidising landholders in undertaking management of
remnant vegetation are detailed above under Management Agreements as the incentives
helping landholders enter agreements. One of the most commonly mentioned subsidies
is for fencing remnant vegetation, with such subsidies being contingent on landholders
entering a management agreement (Elix and Lambert 1998).
Taxes and Rates
Conservation is among the most highly taxed land uses in Australia…land that is
managed for business purposes and monetary donations to charities receives more
favourable taxation treatment than land that is owned and managed for the
protection of high conservation value native vegetation in the public interest
(Binning and Young 1999a).
Revision of the existing land tax and rating structures provides practical possibilities for
improving the conservation of native vegetation. Land tax is the annual charge on the
unimproved value of land levied by state government. It is generally only levied on
land held as an investment, with rural land and land occupied as principal place of
residence exempt. Land tax can be simply viewed as a tax on ‘wealth’. Rates are the
main way local councils raise revenue, approximately 50% of their revenues coming
from this source. They have two components: service charges and general rates, with
money from the latter directed to providing and managing community infrastructure
and services. General rates are based on the land value, so are also a tax on wealth
(Binning and Young 1999b).
Given that both forms of revenue collection are based on land value it seems that how
land is valued is of crucial importance. Many states use unimproved or site value which
would give a similar value and therefore rate for both a largely cleared and largely
uncleared farm even though the latter may have a much smaller relative area generating
income. Binning and Young (1999b) suggest using an improved value so ‘unimproved
land’ such as that covered in native vegetation is not included in the valuation.
Another way of managing land rates and taxes to assist in conserving native vegetation
is to make vegetated areas exempt from tax. A clean way of doing this would require
landholders to enter into a legally binding conservation agreement in return for rates
and taxes exemptions. A compromise position is to differentially rate conservation lands
at a lower rate. Councils could identify high conservation value lands and rates notices
could then inform ratepayers that they could apply to have their land revalued if it is
being managed for nature conservation.
Another possibility centres on deducting expenses from income tax payments. If
landholders are using their land for income-generating purposes they can deduct
expenses, such as rates and taxes, from their income. Currently, they can not seek such
deductions if they are not generating income from the area. For example, a family that13
13
owns an area of bush and keeps it for nature conservation purposes with no associated
income generated, can not claim any tax deductions against it. Changing the tax
provisions to allow deductions such as rates and taxes against income from other
sources would be another financial incentive to keep an area under bush. Binning and
Young (1999b) suggested that such provisions would also require landholders to have
entered a legally binding conservation agreement.
As land values, tax and rates vary widely across Australia, so to will the impacts of
these suggested rate and tax changes. Where rates are low, such as remote rural sites,
rate relief would be largely symbolic and help reinforce existing motivations. In other
areas, especially the coastal zone with its rapid development and often highly-valued
but poorly represented conservation sites, rate and tax relief could be a major incentive
for greater investment in nature conservation (Binning and Young 1999, Williams 2000).
Binning and Young (1997) suggested that the initial costs be borne by the
Commonwealth and State governments and then after this 5 year transition period rate
rebates be ‘built into the rating base of local governments by reviewing the basis for
land valuation and rating’ (Binning and Young 1999).
Environmental Levies
These are a charge imposed on a household. Cripps et al. (1999) suggested using a levy
to fund land purchase and management for nature conservation. Currently, local
government, suggested as the appropriate level of government to impose such a levy by
Cripps et al. (1999), does not have the required powers. One possible means is through
legislative change enabling councils to add an environmental service levy to their
annual rates.
Charges and fees
Site-specific charges could be levied on individuals who contribute to environmental
damage (NNRM Task Force 1999).
3. Market-Based Instruments
An increasingly popular trend in natural resource policy making is to assume that many
of the problems being experienced are due to market failure. The assumption is then
made that if the market can be corrected by valuing previously un-valued goods, such
as remnant vegetation, and creating markets then the failure can be corrected and the
resources will be properly managed. The following approaches to land purchase and
creating tradeable rights and permits are both efforts to create markets for previously
un-valued goods.
Land Purchases, Revolving Funds and Land Trading
This group of policy instruments is directed toward creating a viable, functional market
for remnant vegetation. Revolving funds involve purchasing land, placing that land
under covenant and then re-selling (Cripps et al. 1999). This enables the land to be
purchased by someone who values it, through the market place, for nature conservation.
The only formal revolving fund in Australia is operated by the Victorian Trust for
Nature. This fund focuses on nature conservation, however, a broader focus on
protection and restoration of the rural landscape is also possible (Native Vegetation
Working Group 2000).14
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Bush Brokers in Western Australia is an example of an organisation established to buy
and sell bush blocks. It is a partnership between the World Wide Fund for Nature, the
Real Estate Institute of Western Australia and the Soil and Land Conservation Council.
The partnership aims to provide a structured program for trading in bush blocks,
training and accreditation of estate agents and developing sales procedures with the
relevant government departments (Native Vegetation Working Group 2000).
Land trading and swapping is an innovative approach. Support could be provided for a
group of landholders to re-configure their farms to focus production in areas where it
can be sustained and retire non-productive and high conservation value lands. A farm
or farms could also be retired to make other units viable (Native Vegetation Working
Group 2000). Another feature of land trading could be establishing land banks for lands
of conservation value or likely to be degraded by agricultural activities. Such lands
could be purchased by regional communities and then leased under specific conditions,
resold with convenants attached or placed in government hands (National Natural
Resource Management Task Force, 1999).
Tradeable Permits and Rights
Although not in existence, tradeable permits could be used for salt or greenhouse gases.
The income raised from permits could be reinvested (National Natural Resource
Management Task Force 1999). They are used where property rights are poorly defined.
A ceiling on the level of damage to a common resource such as surface water or
groundwater, or maximum amount of pollution is defined. Permits are then issued to
allow use/pollution of the resource, in this example release of saline water into off-site
water systems, within the limits of the agreed ceiling.
Young and Gunningham (1997) listed development rights, tradeable drainage rights and
tradeable clearing rights as possible instruments available for biodiversity conservation.
Similarly to the permits discussed above, each involves determining an agreed limit
followed by trading within that limit of the rights to clear, drain or develop remnant
vegetation.
4. Self-Regulatory Instruments
Over the last decade there has been an increasing focus, especially in the mining and
manufacturing sector, on self-regulation to improve environmental management. Such
self-regulation has been sought through industry codes of practice and best
management practice, and accreditation, predominantly through quality assurance
means.
Codes of Practice/Best Management Practice
Where native vegetation can be integrated into whole farm management, then industry
codes of practice/best management practice are possibilities. Examples include
TOPCROP for the grain industries and PROGRAZE for grazing industries (ANZECC
2000 in Williams 2000). Codes of practice may also be developed by government and
then voluntarily adopted by landholders. An example is codes of practice developed by
local government for managing roadside vegetation. The ANZECC Native Vegetation
Consultancy (2000) recommended state government departments in Western Australia
investigate the applicability of codes of practice or best management practices for
vegetation management.15
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Accreditation and Environmental Management Systems (EMS)
Consumers are becoming increasingly concerned about the environmental and ethical
impacts of production systems. As such, assurance regarding the environmental
management of production and associated accreditation are likely to be features of
agricultural production in the future (National Natural Resource Management Task
Force 1999). Examples of possible standards guiding Australian agricultural production
include ISO 9000 and ISO 14000. ISO 14000 in particular is concerned with
environmental management (Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand 1996).
The development and implementation of these voluntary, industry-based management
systems and associated accreditation are the responsibility of these industries. There is,
however, a role for government in making sure these systems are compatible across
industries and are accepted by markets as sufficiently rigorous (National Natural
Resource Management Task Force 1999).
Similarly to the above policy instrument, the usefulness of accreditation and EMS is
linked to remnant vegetation management being an integral part of farm business and
whole farm planning and management (Elix and Lambert 1998, Williams 2000). With
this inclusive scenario, retention of remnant vegetation or even replanting could become
a measurable condition of environmental performance.
5. Regulatory Instruments
These instruments rely on legislation and associated regulations to influence landholder
behaviour. These are the most coercive of the policy instruments discussed in this paper.
Also included are land use planning by local government and direct provision through
conservation reserves.
Legislation and Regulation
Almost all dependable policy mixes rely on a ‘substantial underpinning of government
regulation’ (Young and Gunningham 1997). Without accompanying regulation, other
policy instruments are unlikely to succeed (Binning and Young 1997). In Western
Australia, controls over clearing are achieved via a suite of some 10 statutes, the first
enacted in 1928 (Town Planning and Development Act, 1928) and the most recent in 1995
(The Local Government Act, 1995). Most of the controls have been achieved through
accompanying regulations and administrative guidelines and procedures (Native
Vegetation Working Group 2000). South Australia is the only Australian state with
legislation specifically directed toward comprehensively controlling native vegetation
clearing (Native Vegetation Act, 1991). NSW and Victoria, similarly to WA, have sought
regulatory control through a State Environment Planning Policy (SEPP 46, 1995) and
amendments to the Planning and Environment Act, 1987, in 1989 respectively. Queensland
has no vegetation clearing control on freehold land (Binning and Young 1997). The other
states and territories all sit somewhere in between.
Young and Gunningham (1997) cautioned against relying on regulation alone.
Regulations can ‘fail’ especially if there are not the resources to implement and enforce
them. They should be regarded as a safety net to be relied upon if all else fails and are
needed to cover those who do not respond to other incentives. Often too, regulations
address the symptoms of the problem, not the underlying causes. It seems more efficient
and effective to address the underlying causes rather than regulate once the symptoms16
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have appeared. For example, if a farmer receives a tax concession for clearing, it is more
efficient to remove this concession than to regulate to prevent clearing (Young and
Gunningham 1997).
A useful role for regulations is a precautionary one. In Western Australia, for example,
permission is required to clear native vegetation. This precautionary regulation is
backed by a precautionary standard stating that each local government area and farm
must retain at least 20% of its land under native vegetation. Where this precautionary
standard is not met, a landholder who still wishes to clear must show how this will not
adversely affect the environment. This standard offers a means of triggering the
application of other instruments such as management agreements and grants. For
example, approval to clear one area might be made conditional on a covenant being
placed on another area and it being fenced (Young and Gunningham 1997).
Land Use Planning
Local government has the ability to create land use zones that are specifically devoted to
nature conservation (Binning et al. 1999). In the past, de facto zoning for recreation has
been the only means of getting areas set aside for conservation purposes. Land use
zones for nature conservation are now increasingly being voluntarily applied to public
and private lands by local government. They may also use by-laws to make clearing of
native vegetation a development action requiring council consent (Binning et al. 1999).
Councils in all states are also required to take account of the environmental impacts of
developments before giving approval.
Direct Provision
One of the oldest and commonest means of protecting high conservation value lands has
been purchase by the state government using either its own money or Commonwealth
grants. These lands are then added to the broader reserve system and managed by the
state government. Land purchases are still the preferred option, where there is a willing
seller, for areas that fill gaps in the current reserve system or have unique ecological
values requiring the highest level of protection. Examples of the latter include rare flora
that is known form only 1-2 populations and is threatened by clearing and threatened
ecological communities that are similarly few in number and require active
management to address threats such as salinity or clearing.
Making the Choice
Given this suite of available instruments the challenge is to select the ‘best’ instruments.
The response to this challenge has two components: first, determining what best is and
second, providing design principles to get to ‘best’.
Selection Criteria
A standard set of criteria for evaluating public policy exists. Included are economic
efficiency, administrative feasibility and cost, political acceptability and equity
considerations (Table 2). Young and Gunningham (1997) suggested two additional
criteria specific to biodiversity – dependability and precaution. Both are included
because of the lack of knowledge regarding the best ways to conserve biodiversity and
the likely social and economic responses to instruments. The prospect of irreversible loss
also underpins these two criteria.17
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Table 2. Evaluation criteria for determining the ‘best’ policy instruments for biodiversity
conservation (derived from Young and Gunningham 1997)
Criteria Explanation
1. Economic efficiency Trade-offs created by the instrument are achieved at least
cost and the reassignment of property rights makes at least
some one better off and no one worse off
2. Administrative
feasibility and cost
Instrument creates minimal enforcement and monitoring
costs, and its requirements and associated decision-making
processes are easy to understand
3. Political acceptability Instrument motivates people, and is regarded as
legitimate, consistent with government policy and has
bipartisan support
4. Equity No individual or group, now or in the future, is
disadvantaged by the instrument
5. Flexibility Instrument can cope with changing technology, prices and
climate, as well as encouraging innovation and going
‘beyond compliance’
6. Dependability Instrument will deliver the desired target even when
knowledge about biodiversity, and the social and
economic consequences of the instrument, are uncertain
7. Precaution Instrument avoids the chance of serious, irreversible
consequences, especially where there is scientific
uncertainty
Fundamental Design Principles
Several fundamental design principles can be invoked to help achieve the best
outcomes, that is outcomes that meet the criteria listed above (Table 2).
Principle 1. Develop and rely on a complementary mix of policy instruments.
Commentators have suggested a mix of policy instruments rather than a single response
to environmental problems such as biodiversity conservation. The challenge is to
provide this mix while avoiding the dangers of ‘smorgasbordism’, that is, wrongly
assuming the more instruments the better (Gunningham and Sinclair 199X). Providing
information inherently complements all other instruments. Such provision motivates
individual and community action and makes them more likely to respond positively to
a range of instruments (Young and Gunningham 1997). The lack of knowledge and
certainty in relation to biodiversity management makes the flexibility inherent in
information provision invaluable.
Voluntary instruments should also be part of the mix. To re-cap, a voluntary instrument
is one which allows an individual or group to chose whether or not they use it (the first
four of the five categories in Table 1 are voluntary instruments). The freedom of choice18
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offered by voluntary instruments provides the flexibility needed to deal with the lack of
knowledge and uncertainty associated with biodiversity conservation. Binning and
Young (1997) commented, however, that voluntary programs are unlikely on their own
to change behaviour in the short term. They are most effective in creating behavioural
change incrementally in the long term. Where substantial changes in the short term are
required, then financial incentives (one form of voluntary instrument) and legal means
(ie, legislation, regulation) are required. During these short-term transitional periods
when property rights are being redefined, voluntary instruments may be useful in
developing and maintaining positive community attitudes.
The last important element in this policy mix is regulatory instruments. Young and
Gunningham (1997) argued that a regulatory safety net is essential for biodiversity
conservation. Regulations are needed to encourage compliance by those with little
commitment to biodiveristy conservation. They are also needed to complement market-
based instruments, for example tradeable clearing rights where a ceiling on the
acceptable level of damage needs to be set.
Principle 2. Clearly identify the property rights associated with remnant vegetation on
private land and select and apply policy instruments accordingly.
As mentioned earlier, the majority of land in the WA wheatbelt is privately owned.
Thus, a key consideration in choosing policy instruments is clearly defining property
rights and the associated entitlements and obligations. Landholders in Australia
strongly believe they have the right to do as they wish on their own land. However,
associated with this ownership is a private obligation to manage their remnant
vegetation in a sustainable way. This obligation extends across the whole farm, and is
recognised as a duty of care (Binning and Young 1997).
Duty of care is an attractive concept, however, landholders may not recognise it or what
responsibilities are entailed. As such, the best approach is using instruments that enable
the costs associated with landholders’ duty of care to be incorporated into the normal
costs of production. This suggests the development and use of market-based, self-
regulatory and regulatory tools. There will also be a role for financial tools such as tax
and rate changes. Binning and Young (1997) emphasised that landholders should not
receive ongoing financial support for activities within their normal duty of care.
There is also a public element provided by remnant vegetation through its contribution
to the aesthetic value of rural landscapes, regional soil and water quality and broader
biodiversity values. These public goods currently have no market value. They can be
regarded as a public conservation service provided by the landholder (Binning and
Young 1997). Examples include remnant vegetation management at a regional scale to
enhance biodiversity conservation and sustaining sites of unique conservation value
(Williams 2000). It seems reasonable to use public subsidies, through financial
instruments, to support landholders providing a public conservation service.
Transitional payments are an innovative approach to encourage landholders to change
their ideas about the obligations associated with their remnant vegetation. For example,
a landholder may sign a management agreement and receive a one-off payment for
fencing. The payment recognises that the landholder is providing a public conservation
service. However its one-off nature signals that ongoing management costs should be
met by the landholder. In other words, managing the remnant for conservation has19
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become part of his or her duty of care. In this situation, the payment is a circuit breaker
assisting a transition to a more stringent duty of care. Such an approach is effectively
redefining property rights (Binning and Young 1997).
Principle 3. Recognise that the choice of policy instruments depends on the context.
Preliminary research findings reviewed by Williams (2000) suggest that different
instruments for remnant vegetation conservation are needed in different places in
Australia because of differing legislative, environmental and social circumstances. For
example, rates rebates are more effective where land values and development pressures
are highest. Financial incentives are best tailored to meet the management needs of
specific ecological communities faced with specific threats. The choice of level of
incentive offered may also be influenced by the social circumstances of the landholders.
Pannell (2001) similarly noted that for salinity policy to be effective it had to be able to
deal with a heterogeneity of economic, social and environmental circumstances.
Principle 4. Recognise, analyse and work with existing institutional structures as an
essential first step in choosing policy instruments.
In Australia, the institutions most likely to be developing and applying instruments for
remnant vegetation conservation are the three tiers of government, industry and the
community. The Commonwealth government, with its current financial ascendancy
over the states, uses grants to dictate policy in areas nominally the responsibility of the
states. The Natural Heritage trust is a case in point, with the Commonwealth specifying
how the $1.5 billion is to be spent on environmental matters. However, the choice of
policy instruments available to the Commonwealth is generally restricted to educational
and financial incentive ones, with regulatory means beyond its control. The states on the
other hand can draw on regulatory as well as motivational and financial instruments.
Local governments are the ‘dark horse’ in many discussions of environmental policy
instruments. Contrary to perceptions, they have a range of instruments available,
especially regulatory ones such as zoning and providing financial benefits to
landholders through rate relief (Binning et al. 1999). Elected officials (ie, politicians)
from all levels of government usually prefer the least coercive instruments possible.
They thus show a preference for motivational rather than regulatory instruments.
A diversity of policy instruments is available to the non-government sector. Industry
members may enter into partnerships with landholders, a motivational instrument, with
or without accompanying financial incentives. Alcoa’s involvement in landcare activities
in Western Australia is an example. Another role for industry is through establishing
producer codes of practice or accreditation, both self-regulatory instruments. Non-
government conservation organisations may become involved through administering
land purchasing schemes (a market-based instrument) or providing education and
information (motivational instrument).
Policy instruments developed and used by communities have been advocated as the
solution to environmental problems. Partnerships between communities and others, as a
motivational instrument, is popular rhetoric in natural resource management (Moore et
al. submitted). However, farmers are becoming increasingly tired and disillusioned with
partnership approaches to land management, such as Landcare (Pannell 2001). It thus
seems more effective to design other instruments so they facilitate ready and practical20
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implementation of the desired changes rather than continue to dwell inordinately on
partnerships as a preferred instrument.
Young and Gunningham (1997) commented that policies for biodiversity conservation
will be more effective if they use and adapt to existing institutional arrangements.
Existing weaknesses, such as inequitable tax systems, should be addressed rather than
new remedial structures superimposed. Their views imply a faith in the ability of
existing systems to cope with and adjust to change, an optimism that may not be shared
by all commentators.
Remnant vegetation conservation and the underlying goal of biodiversity conservation
is based on the tension between the need to act locally while thinking and planning
more broadly. Ultimately, the success of such conservation in agricultural areas such as
the WA wheatbelt depends on the actions of individual landholders. Thus, authority
and responsibility for action should be transferred to the lowest level (Young and
Gunningham 1997). This idea underlies current enthusiasm for landcare and catchment
groups and local government taking lead roles in designing and implementing policy
instruments. However, not all decisions need to be made at this lowest level. To achieve
regional, state and national biodiversity outcomes, policy involvement at all decision-
making scales is crucial.
Principle 5. Consider the views and preferences of landholders when developing and
implementing new policy instruments.
In the WA wheatbelt and most agricultural landscapes, the actions of individual
landholders are fundamental to the success of landscape restructuring efforts. It is
crucial therefore, to find out from them what instruments they think will work, what
they favour and how should equity concerns associated with existing and changing
property rights and obligations be resolved. A range of views will be provided based on
a range of experiences and levels of intellectual ability. But, like all of us, landholders
have much to contribute to discussions on changes to their workplace and where they
live. The benefits of such discussions for landscape restructuring include better ideas
and decisions, and hopefully better acceptance of the suite of possible instruments,
including regulation and market-based mechanisms.
Conclusions
Restructuring rural landscapes depends on the actions that meet the triple bottom line
(Fig.1). As such, they must be economically gainful, culturally (socially) adoptable and
ecologically possible. This paper has focused on social and economic influences on
landscape restructuring by private landholders for remnant vegetation conservation. Of
these, economic considerations are centrally important – if a change is not economically
gainful or at least makes the landholder no worse off, it will not be made.
Also important in terms of understanding social influences is decreasing the attention
given to landholders’ attitudes. Most landholders espouse a conservation ethic, but as
with many attitudes expressed by people, these are often not translated into action. It is
far more valuable to gain an understanding of the influences of landholders’ perceptions
of environmental problems as these directly influence the actions they take.
Numerous policy instruments, ranging from voluntary to involuntary, with and without
financial incentives, can be used to assist landholders to change their behaviour. Design21
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principles suggest a mix of regulatory, financial and motivational instruments, with the
mix varying from place to place. Also essential is working with and understanding
existing institutions. Key institutions are the three tiers of government, industry,
community groups and individuals. Each institution has different instruments it has the
mandate and capability to use. For example, only the Commonwealth can use changes
to income tax as a policy instrument. Community groups and industry often have the
flexibility lacking within government to trial market-based instruments.22
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